Denis Percy Frederick Tall’s War. Died: 2 Nov 1917 Palestine
                            Home Page   Family History    Tall Family Start     Military    29 March 2007

Denis, Percy & Annie’s second son, a railway cleaner volunteered and joined the Northamptonshire Regiment on the 11 November 1914 – 47 days before his 18^th birthday (the official age of enlistment was 19!). He was 5’11" tall and fit, having a girth of 35½" and a chest expansion of 3½". I suspect he was very frustrated that he was not sent abroad until August 1916, when he embarked for Egypt.

The Photograph on the right shows Denis standing tall in the middle of the back row.  An enlargement of his face is included upper right.  To the rear of the sergeant, standing on the extreme right of the photo, can be seen a large tent. Behind the soldiers is a store with a corrugated iron roof.

The following chart illustrates clearly Denis's fighting experience:

The above chart created uses official records of the cause and time of death of soldiers.

The 1/4th Battalion of the Northamptonshire Regiment was part of the 162 Brigade of the 54th or East Anglian Division which was itself part of the Egyptian Expeditionary force ( E.E.F.).

The East Anglian Division. Unless specified otherwise, battalions in division between 04 Aug 1914 - 31 Oct 1918

In Egypt the Allied forces faced a Turkish army. But, it was not until early 1917 that British forces were strong enough for an assault to be organised. The description below is based on three sources of evidence: Denis’s war time records, the Northamptonshire Regiments war diary (both available at the Public Record Office, Kew) and several WWW pages, in particular:

In the descriptions below all references to the 1/4 Northamptonshire battalion, division and brigade , have been highlighted in red, and all direct quotes from the war diary in blue. Note: it was not until April 19^th that the Northamptonshire battalion suffered any number of casualties – indicating that they were reserves before that date.

The Egyptian Expeditionary force ( E.E.F.) in 1916 saw little action but digging and re-enforcing fortifications at the Suez canal. 1916 ended with the British occupation of El Arish and successes at Magdhaba (December 23rd) Rafa (Jan 7th). The 54^th division advanced from the Canal defences in January and February 1917.

This battle was ‘lost’ after it had actually been won! The bald description of the battle is :-

Sources on the web argue that the battle failed because of unnecessary delays, lack of synchronisation and lack of artillery support at critical periods during the day. The Generals responsible were too far from the battle front. Fear of enemy reinforcements led them to order the 54^th division to withdraw; to the dismay of the Australian leader General Chauvel who protested: "But we have Gaza!" the following is the Australian description of the order to withdraw:

The message to withdraw reached Ryrie and Chaytor at about 6.20, some twenty minutes before the infantry and Canterburys gained Ali Muntar. To the Australian and New Zealand leaders the order seemed incredible. Their regiments had made a great advance …. had found the Turks demoralized and disinclined to fight, and had suffered practically no casualties. Even in the failing light they had not the least fear as to continuing their advance, since every indication pointed to a rout and general surrender at any moment. Chaytor demonstrated his opinion of the order by exercising his right to have it sent to him in writing before he acted upon it; and Ryrie, conscious that if it was immediately obeyed he must leave behind and sacrifice a large number of his widely scattered men, bluntly told his staff officers that there was to be no withdrawal until every trooper had been collected. "Not a man is to be left behind." As the order was slowly communicated from brigade to regiment, and on to the distant squadrons and troops, it was everywhere received first with doubt and then with disgust. Again and again the astonished and puzzled officers ordered their signalers to have it repeated and, when its truth was beyond question, they felt as men could only feel who were ordered to accept defeat, when in their opinion the battle was won and the objective actually in their hands". http://members.optushome.com.au/pasu/first_gaza.htm

Confusion caused both British and Turkish commander’s to consider themselves beaten. Von Kressenstein halted his 12,500 men and 50 gun reinforcements; Major Tiller, Gaza’s commandment, blew up his own wireless station, and Dobell recalled his troops

British losses: 3,500 casualties and 500 missing
Turkish losses: 2397 and 57 German Gunners (Bullock p44-46)

In the Imperial Museum’s ‘First World War in Photographs’ book by Richard Holmes (p236) this photograph is identified as involving members of the 1/4^th Northamptonshire Battalion at First Gaza. From the Death index graph drawn earlier, either the identification of the regiment  or the Battle must be incorrect – Second Gaza?

Sadly the British Commander, General Murray, was over-confident. In his second message to the War Office he wrote, "It was a most successful operation, the fog and waterless nature of the country just saving the enemy from complete disaster. It has filled our troops with enthusiasm, and proved conclusively that the enemy has no chance against our troops in the open." In his final dispatch upon the engagement (dated 28th March, 1917) Murray grossly over estimated the Turkish casualties as 8,000. Even worse the Turkish leaders now knew the British plan of attack.

Whilst Denis’s Northamptonshire Regiment was not involved in this battle, they were involved in the subsequent attack , known as the Second Battle of Gaza. However, in the short three week period before the advance, the Turks turned what had been open cavalry country into a fortified position which prevented any turning movement. Around Gaza, a warren of defences termed ‘The Beer’, ‘EL Arish’, and descriptively — ‘The Labyrinth’ were created. Engineers sited their redoubts for mutually supporting and enfilade fire, and with direct field of fire along any approach. Redoubts continued southeast along the Beersheba Road, in strength, but not in a strictly contiguous line.

The Northamptonshire Battalion’s preparation for the repeat attack was as follows:

*OR = Other Ranks Northamptonshire Reg’t War Diary

Northamptonshire Reg’t War Diary

Early on the 19th April at 07.30 after air bombardment various battalions advanced towards the Gaza-Beersheba road. The 163^rd Brigades left and center were held up 400 yards from their objective and became pinned down. On the left the 162^nd Brigade had been more successful and the 52^nd division had made a larger lodgement and was fighting hard to maintain it.

Northamptonshire Reg’t War Diary

Twelve men in the Northamptonshire Battalion were awarded medals: Capt. D.R.Church DSO; Lt H.Burdett MC; Lieut. Dudley Ross Church DSO; 2/Lt S.R.Bower, MC; 2/Lt L.R.Bowen MC; CSM H.Hardy DCM; Sgt T.Briody DCM; Cpl W.Jones MM; L.Cpl A.Watts MM, LCpl L.West MM; Pte L.West MM. In the war diary the reasons for the awards are given. The following quotes are of individuals in different positions in the Battalion:

Lieut. Dudley Ross Church "On April 19^th was in command of Left Company when despite heavy barrage of gun and machine gun fire he reached to within 500 yards of Turks trenches, which position he maintained until Dusk himself being twice wounded and his company suffering 80% casualties."

2/Lt Stanley Robert Bower "In the action of the 19^th April showed great gallantry and presence of mind after losing the use of his right arm. He crawled about in the barley collecting ammunition from the wounded and got two Lewis guns, teams of which had all been knocked out, into action, worked by odd men he had collected."

CSM Harry Hardy "In the action of the 19^th, although twice wounded when all his officers were wounded, rallied men and collected stragglers and formed a strong firing line."

Private C.H.Norton "Since the action of the 19 April has done excellent work as a patrol sniper, he has on two occasions stayed out 24 hrs observing and sniping."

The war diary refers to trench duty in the remainder of April with, on two occasions, shelling. At the end of April, the Battalion’s strength is described as follows:: "Strength of Bⁿ at End of month With Unit 12 Officers 476 OR. Attached 2 Officers, medical officer & chaplain."

General Allenby took over command after the second battle of Gaza. General Allenby’s headquarters were very simple:

"A Spartan life was the rule at GHQ. Work has the order of the day every day. Continually with his troops, it can be said with absolute truth that no commander in chief was better known to his soldiers, and none possessed in a higher degree the affection and confidence of his men." Massey W.T., 1920, "Allenby’s Final Triumph" London: Constable p8 (reported in Bullock (1988))

Allenby emphasised secrecy and the ‘need to know’ . It was known that the Turks had had friendly Arab spies located behind EEF lines.  During the summer and early autumn the RFC was pleased with the arrival of Bristol Fighters since they were equal to any of the German 300th Flight Detachment aeroplanes,  with its greater numbers the EEF was able to regain mastery of the skies and prevent the sort of enemy aerial reconnaissance which had proved so useful to the defence before Second Gaza (Bullock, Allenby’s War).

Lawrence ‘of Arabia’ describes Allenby’s thoroughness, reporting that "Allenby every morning

before breakfast had a log of Turkish signals over the preceding 24 hours: and we read every message - and I presume they read all hours. To keep our moves secret we used air-mail or word of mouth. To keep the Turks’ public, one of my cares was to distribute wire-cutters over their rear and cut their telegraph at least daily."  
     (Liddell Hart, 1934, "Lawrence of Arabia and After Jonathan Cape. p141 reported in Bullock)

The underlying attack planned by General Chetwode and Brigadier Dawnay and accepted by Allenby, considered that it would be dangerous to simply repeat the attack on Gaza. Instead it would be better to attack the other end of the defensive line at Beersheba. When Beersheba fell, the mounted arm could move forward prevent reinforcements reaching Gaza from Jerusalem and ultimately advance to the sea cutting Gaza off.

The essential aspect was to prevent the Turks realising this and reinforcing Beersheba. The army leaked cipher messages emphasising the importance of Gaza and the desirability of an amphibious landing behind the town. A week’s preliminary bombardment of Gaza was planned in conjunction with the Royal Navy to firm up any remaining doubts.  During these days, of course, the main EEF attack troops would be deployed on the Beersheba flank.

Reminiscent of the ‘Man Who Never Was’, an elaborate deception known as the ‘Haversack Ruse’ was perpetrated by an officer of the Intelligence Branch named Meinertzhagen. With a small patrol, Meinertzhagen allowed the Turks to spot and fire on him. As the Turks pursued, he feigned wounded and dropped a haversack, prestained with blood and carrying odd £20 sterling notes, personal letters, and a cipher ‘code’ in simple dummy messages. The messages recorded the ‘impossibilities’ of any move against Beersheba, yet ‘objected’ to the imminent offensive on Gaza.

The ‘Haversack Ruse’ was given validity by mock Desert Mounted Corps orders demanding retrieval of the ‘lost’ haversack. These ‘orders’ were left cleverly crumpled among sandwich wrappers in the van of a local Turkish advance where they would be sure to be found. The Turks thought they were on to something big, for amusingly enough, the commander of 20th Corps congratulated his sergeant for finding such valuable intelligence and warned his officers about carrying such similarly compromising material!

The ¼ Northamptonshire’s training for the subsequent attack on Gaza was again thorough:

Having completed operational training, bathing parades became common, seven being mentioned in the war diary between the 22^nd. and 29^th. inclusive.

On the 31^st October 800 men of the Australian 4th Light Horse Brigade attacked Beersheba. It left an incredible legacy of the Australian character as tough, just, self sacrifice, honour and foremost, sticking by your mates when your backs are against the wall. The attack is pictured below:

Three lines of horsemen with bayonets flashing in hand, stretching 1100 meters across, advanced 3 miles up the broad gently sloping valley. It is believed that the Turks must have failed to lower their rifle sights (set at 1500 meters). Only 31 Light Horse men died in the Turkish hail of fire as they charged in with the hail of rifle and machine gun bullets passing over their heads.

Two sheets describing the Northamptonshire Regiments role in the battle plan, the above traced map and four sheets of ‘preliminary instructions’ for the battle are included in the war diary. Instructions relating to individual soldiers included:

DRESS. Fighting Order with 1 iron and 1 mobile ration in Haversack. Tin discs 4 ins. square will be worn bent
               diagonally round bottom centre of Haversack.
              The Mess Tin in Cover will be carried on the Belt.
              Small Box Respirator will be carried.
              Two sandbags will be carried in the Belt.
              Steel Helmets, Cap Comforters, and Cardigans will be carried or worn.
WATER BOTTLES. To complete to two per man have been applied for, and will be issued as soon as they arrive.
WATER PURIFICATION. Bisulphate tablets will be issued…. When the Waterbottle is full two tablets must be   
               dissolved in it and left for half an hour.

Denis would clearly have hoped that the 4 tanks whose "movements will be timed to correspond with those of the leading waves of Infantry." would make life a lot easier than in his second battle

On the 30^th the Northamptonshire Regiment marched through Wadi Ghuzze (Wadi Ghazi) to "O·34·d Central". The night attack was designed to reduce casualties.

The only information we have on what happened to Denis comes from a friend who saw him die. Apparently he was killed by a sniper’s bullet on the 2nd Nov., 1917. The friend added, that later that day, the sniper himself was killed.

On the 3^rd. the situation was unchanged, this time the 1/4^th Essex regiment failed to take TORTOISE HILL and BELAH TRENCH. The Northamptonshire regiment was heavily shelled. By the 6^th of November the Battalion is described as having:

Interestingly on the same day Denis died (November 2 1917) Arthur James Balfour, in a letter to Lord Walter Rothschild of England, affirmed Britain's commitment to the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine (The Balfour Declaration.).             http://www.humanitas-international.org/showcase/chronography/timebase/1917tbse.htm

For anyone wanting to discover what subsequently happened to the Northamptonshire ¼ Battalion look at a web page which describes Dr. David Payne’s fathers experiences first at the Somme and then in Palestine. David’s father joined the 1/4^th battalion within days of Denis Tall’s death:
                                              http://www.powell76.freeserve.co.uk/MyFathersWar.htm

Tall Pte Dennis Percy Frederick 200696. 1st/4th Bn. Northamptonshire Regt. 2nd Nov., 1917 Age 20. Son of Percy and Annie Tall of 51 Stanley Rd., Wellingborough. XV.B.13

David Tall visiting his uncle's grave.

The commonwealth war grave record on the web is as follows:

http://www.cwgc.org/          Denis Percy Tall

Cemetery: GAZA WAR CEMETERY Country: Israel 

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