| BOOK REVIEW |
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Superpowers Defeated- Douglas. A. Borer-Frank Cass Publishers-London ?1999-ISBN-0-7146-4409-9 (Paper)-261 Pages-Price -26.50 USD (Excluding Postage). By Agha Humayun Amin Afghanistan and Vietnam have been repeatedly compared since both
events occurred almost within half a decade of the end of one and both involved USSR and USA in a switched role changing from supporter of guerrilla forces to one involved
in confrontation with guerrilla forces. Douglas A. Borer an assistant professor at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University endeavours in this book to
compare Vietnam and Afghanistan. Borer?s book compares Afghanistan and Vietnam exploring and analysing the similarities as well as important differences between the two.
The subject matter is to a great degree intangible and Borer?s analysis is an important addition to the limited number of analytical books written on Afghanistan in the
west. Borer?s book is the second important analytical work on Afghanistan since Mark Galeotti?s more comprehensive work
"Afghanistan: The Soviet Union?s Last War" (Frank Cass-1995). Borer?s conclusions are different from Galeotti and this fact adds to the importance of Borer?s work,
regardless of the fact whether anyone may agree with Borer?s analysis or not. Borer proceeds in a logical manner and compares Vietnam and Afghanistan starting with the historical background
followed by examining the factors that led to superpower intervention, transition from containment to detainment, detainment and impact on home front which includes a
conclusion in which all the findings are summed up. Borer?s knowledge of early Afghan history is limited and this is not helped by the fact that he relies on indirect
US authorities to support certain assertions, which in reality are historically incorrect. Thus he claims on that Lord Melbourne?s government fell because of disasters in
Afghanistan (page-5) during the first Afghan War, while in reality the disasters in Afghanistan commenced in January 1842 while Lord Melbourne?s Whig government was
defeated in August 1841 and because of reasons which did not have any connection with any disasters in Afghanistan. The First Afghan War as a matter of fact was a private
war of the English East India Company and had nothing to do with Lord Melbourne. As a matter of fact Earl of Auckland the Governor General of India who started it was
appointed a member of British cabinet (First Lord of Admiralty) of Lord Russell on his recall from India in 1842. There is no doubt that it was grossly mishandled but it
had little similarity with the subsequent Russian occupation of Afghanistan. The Second Afghan War was an altogether different affair from the first one and was not a
British withdrawal (page-6) as the writer asserts. The second phase of the war saw the British and Afghan Amir operating in concert and fighting against Sardar Ayub Khan
who was defeated by General Roberts with full support of Amir Abdul Rahman Khan at Kandahar. The Second Afghan War resulted in total subjugation of Afghan foreign policy to
Britain and installed a pro British king in Afghanistan who (and whose successor) stayed loyal to Britain and discouraged the NWFP frontier tribes from anti-British
revolts. Afghanistan was forced to recognise a defined border (Durand Line) with India, a fact which went to the great advantage of Pakistan after 1947 and was saved from
Czarist Russia at a time when the Russians subdued far more ferocious people in Caucasus and Central Asia. The British aim in the 1880s was to create a buffer state with
its foreign policy in British hands between Russia and India .The British admirably succeeded in this policy which ensured that Afghanistan stayed neutral in WW One when at
one time there were only 15,000 British troops defending India. Borer differs from Galeotti whose conclusion about the Soviet War in Afghanistan was that "To suggest that the
defeat in Afghanistan doomed Soviet Union is patently unfounded". Borer thinks that the Afghan War was more significant than what Galeotti thought. Borer agrees that
Afghanistan was just one of the factors but qualifies this by adding that Afghanistan was an important factor. Some of the writers observations are naﶥ. On page 78 he states that the US tilt towards Pakistan was a blunder and
that USA should have relied on India. The on ground realities as they stood in 1979-80 , with a hostile Iran in the grip of a violent revolution and India ruled by an
uncertain coalition and with no land link with Afghanistan gave the USA no choice but Pakistan. The analysis comparing Vietnam and Afghanistan explodes many myths. Like Tarraki and Amin were prodded into saying
prayers in public by their Soviet advisors! Indiscriminate killing of civilians in Afghanistan and Vietnam was justified by both the US and Red Army since in both cases the
rebels or the insurgents had initiated the atrocities; a replay of Pakistan Army Action in 1971! That the intervention in Afghanistan was a political decision taken
despite opposition by Soviet Military leaders, i.e the commander of the Soviet Ground Forces. 50,000 members of the 90,000 Afghan Army joined the insurgents. Soviet Union
only spent a maximum of 2% of its defence budget on the Afghan War while US expenditure in Vietnam at one time reached the figure of 23% of the US Defence Budget in 1969.
The Soviet troops to terrain ratio never exceeded 0.7 troops per square mile as compared to US ratio in Vietnam of Seven Troops per square mile. Douglas Borer?s book is a welcome addition to the list of books dealing with the Afghan War and deserves to be read
by all researchers dealing with the Afghan War. Borer?s book provides a broad view and is useful for both the layman and the specialist. This is the first time that the
Afghan and Vietnam Wars have been compared and Borer deserves 100 percent marks for doing so. |